Training / Course 07
Cross the operator boundary and learn to defend it. The roaming architecture (home vs visited network, the IPX, the DEA and the SEPP), legacy SS7/MAP and CAMEL flows and why they are dangerous, Diameter roaming over S6a, VoLTE/VoNR roaming (S8HR vs local breakout), 5G roaming secured by the SEPP over N32/PRINS, signalling firewalls built to GSMA guidance (FS.11/FS.19), roaming-fraud detection (IRSF, Wangiri, SIM-box), and the on-call side — incident response and operations. Offline-first.
Aims — what you can do after
- Draw the roaming architecture — home/visited networks, the IPX, the DEA and the SEPP — and say what each node does.
- Read SS7/MAP and CAMEL roaming flows as call-flow ladders.
- Read Diameter roaming flows (S6a) and explain Diameter routing, realms and the border gateway.
- Explain VoLTE & VoNR roaming — home-routed (S8HR) vs local breakout (LBO), and where the media goes.
- Explain 5G roaming security — the SEPP, N32, PRINS vs TLS, and roaming over the service-based interface.
- Operate a signalling firewall — classify inbound SS7/Diameter/GTP by attack category and block the dangerous ones.
- Detect roaming fraud — IRSF, Wangiri, SIMbox, SMS and location fraud — with rules and ML.
- Run a roaming incident — monitor the right KPIs, localize a cross-operator fault, and follow an on-call runbook.
Two operators, one subscriber
Subscriber Visited network (VPMN) IPX Home network (HPMN) | | | | |---attach---------->| | | the UE is abroad | |---signalling---->|--DEA/SEPP---->| border nodes screen it | |<----profile------|<--------------| the home network authorizes # DEA guards the Diameter border (4G); SEPP guards the SBI border (5G)
A roaming call spans two operators — know which network owns each leg.
Flow — the 4G roaming attach (S6a)
MME (visited) DEA (border) HSS (home) | | | |--Auth-Info-Req---->|-------------------|--> give me a vector |<--Auth-Info-Ans----|<------------------| RAND/AUTN/XRES/K... |--Update-Location-->|-------------------|--> I am serving this user |<--Update-Loc-Ans---|<------------------| subscription data # every message is realm-routed across operators — the DEA is the choke point
The 4G roaming attach: the visited network asks the home network to authorize the subscriber.
Three generations, three borders
2G / 3G SS7 / SIGTRAN MAP + CAMEL border: SS7 firewall 4G / EPC Diameter S6a / S8 / S9 border: DEA + Diameter firewall 5G / SA HTTP/2 (SBI) N32 via the SEPP border: SEPP (PRINS / TLS)
One subscriber, three generations of roaming signalling — and where the border control lives.
Defence — the signalling firewall
inbound SS7 / Diameter / GTP message | +-- expected for this subscriber & location ------> allow +-- category 1: should never cross a border ------> block +-- category 2: only from the home network ------> verify origin +-- category 3: plausible but abusable ------> rate-limit + alert # categories follow GSMA signalling-security guidance
The signalling firewall: classify every inbound cross-border message, then block the dangerous ones.
Voice roaming & the fraud you learn to catch
Voice roaming forks on where the media anchors — home-routed vs local breakout. The fraud module detects the classic roaming scams with rules and machine learning on synthetic call-detail records.
Module breakdown
What defending the boundary looks like
- Trace a subscriber's attach across two operators and know which node owns each leg.
- Classify an inbound signalling message by attack category and decide block vs allow.
- Tell home-routed from local-breakout voice roaming by where the media anchors.